US President Donald Trump’s continued efforts to control Venezuela’s oil are based on the assumption that the United States can successfully “govern” a country twice the size of Iraq. However, rather than projecting force abroad, this military overreach reveals the growing vulnerability of a president whose once-firm grip on American politics is weakening. In this context, the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro marked the beginning of a shift towards a more militarized global energy market. It also highlights the consequences of deliberately destabilizing an oil-dependent economy. Far from resolving Venezuela’s current crisis, Trump’s actions threaten to make it even worse. Regime change in Venezuela is unlikely to end with a clear “mission accomplished” moment. Iraq alone required at least nine years of sustained U.S. intervention, plunging the country into civil war, claiming the lives of more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians, and costing U.S. taxpayers approximately $2 trillion—an expense the United States can hardly afford today. Trump’s intervention raises two fundamental questions: who will govern Venezuela? And who will benefit, at least in the short and medium term, from its oil wealth? In oil states, these questions are inseparable, given that the survival of their regimes—whether democratic or authoritarian—depends on their ability to capture the benefits generated by oil exports and distribute them among the main interest groups. The current Venezuelan crisis sets several worrying precedents in foreign policy. Notably, it is the first US military intervention to completely dispense with humanitarian and security justifications in favor of an explicit appropriation of resources. It is also the first US military incursion into the South American continent. If past interventions in Central America and the Caribbean are any guide, it is likely to lead to the rise of a criminal regime and new waves of migration. As in other resource-rich countries such as Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, vast oil reserves will not protect Venezuela from a similar fate. Maduro’s ouster has left Venezuela with no good options. Its divided opposition may seek a power-sharing agreement or elections, but a civilian government led by Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado is unlikely to survive long. Therefore, the Trump Administration could seek continuity of the regime through a negotiated agreement with the most powerful elements of the Chavista coalition. Such an agreement would leave the armed forces, security services and civilian militias intact. The military’s top brass, handsomely rewarded for preserving the status quo, would likely remain deeply entrenched in key sectors such as construction, food distribution and oil. A second, more dangerous scenario is that Maduro’s ouster creates a power vacuum, fueling political and military fragmentation and triggering turf wars between feuding armed groups and criminal organizations. A violent fight over territory and illicit markets could transform Venezuela from a corruption-ridden but relatively stable country into a fractured battlefield akin to contemporary Libya. With its jungles, mountains, dense urban centers and porous borders, Venezuela is particularly suited to guerrilla warfare. Political fragmentation and protracted fighting would turn the country into a center of regional instability, perhaps dragging the United States into another “forever war” that air and naval forces could not contain. And the lure of gaining control of Venezuela’s oil reserves would likely keep more armed groups in the fight longer. These reserves—larger than Saudi Arabia’s and more than five times larger than the United States’—represent enormous potential, especially for a relatively small economy with a large, dispersed population. But the key word is potential. Even during its previous democratic period, Venezuela’s oil sector was crippled by chronic inefficiencies. Since 1998, production has plummeted 75% due to a toxic mix of low oil prices, US sanctions, corruption and economic mismanagement. So who will benefit from what is left of the Venezuelan oil industry? Trump has announced that Venezuela will transfer up to 50 million barrels of oil to the United States and that the proceeds will remain under his personal control. He has also urged major American oil companies to enter — or re-enter — the country, promising to reimburse them for the billions of dollars needed to repair their damaged infrastructure. According to him, these investments would allow Venezuela to recover its status as a major exporter within a period of 18 months. But this period is pure fantasy, since the reconstruction of the Venezuelan oil industry would require an estimated investment of 100 billion dollars over a period of seven to 10 years. Therein lies the dilemma of petrostates. Global oversupply, low oil prices and a shortage of investable capital mean that Trump’s strategy poses an existential risk for any Venezuelan government. Even without Maduro, the Chavista coalition remains united by access to oil rents, criminal networks, patronage systems, the threat of repression and the emigration of nearly eight million potential dissidents. Given that the ideological core of Chavismo is oil nationalism, Trump’s rhetoric could unite Venezuelans against what is widely perceived as the plundering of their country’s natural resources. That reaction is already evident, and Maduro’s opponents and allies alike condemn the United States. Venezuela’s staggering social and economic collapse under Maduro underscores the dangers of Trump’s strategy. Between 2013 and 2021, the country’s economy shrank to a quarter of its previous size; Inflation is expected to exceed 680% in 2026; and 80% of the population lives in conditions of extreme poverty. Diverting Venezuelan oil revenues to the United States would necessarily deprive any government of the funds necessary to deal with this crisis. In theory, Trump could declare victory and abandon his attempt to seize Venezuela’s oil. Of course, this outcome is unlikely. Trump came for the oil and he is determined to get it. But contrary to his expectations, Maduro’s ouster may push that goal further away, destabilizing the region and accelerating Trump’s own internal decline. Terry Lynn Karl is a professor at Stanford University and author of The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (University of California Press, 1997).
