April 2025 has been for many a reminder of how fine is the line that separates the confidence of suspicion. In the subsequent sessions of the «Day of Liberation» the US dollar depreciated intensely, while the asset without risk par excellence – the long -term debt of the American Treasury – fell in price in a context of strong assignments in stock markets and increased volatility. This combination is a statistical anomaly and, to some extent, psychological: for the first time in decades the US Treasury debt ceased to behave as an “antifragile” asset – quality of those assets that are strengthened and provides coverage before episodes of high volatility and risk aversion. Although the steps taken by Donald Trump as of April 9 – 90 -day truce of truce to negotiate tariffs, softening of the statements related to the president of the Federal Reserve, and willingness to initiate commercial negotiations with China – have largely corrected the situation generated of the beginning and denote that the markets have made Trump see the political and economic cost of their strategy, the suspicion persists. Understanding how disturbing the anomaly observed in financial markets needs a brief review of the so -called «exceptionalism» of the United States, or the unique capacity of the country to finance persistent deficits without penalty by the market, thanks to the global centrality of the dollar and structural confidence in its institutions. While the world looks for the dollar and the US Treasury to protect, and while foreign direct investment receives the country as a safe port, the financing cost of its public debt will be lower than its fiscal foundations suggest. It is, in other words, the «imperial» privilege that the US has enjoyed for decades. This exceptionalism rests on five pillars. The first, the US economic scale and depth, the largest emitter of negotiable financial assets – actions and bonds – and that offers a liquidity that allows absorbing, without apparent friction, the external savings in search of security. The second, the solidity of their rule of law: strong property protection and an independent judiciary grant certainty to direct investment and portfolio, making the US the preferential destination of international capital. Third, the global dollar network, currency present in the vast majority of exchange transactions and dominates the billing of raw materials. Fourth, the key role of the US Treasury debt as risk -free and antifragile asset since World War II: its function of universal collateral, liquid and safe, gives you a non -pecuniary or convenience performance – surely in times of uncertainty. Finally, American military power has supported a dense system of alliances that, indirectly, anchor official reserves in dollars – who depends on the protection of Washington usually keeps the currency of this country available. This balance is in question today. The first challenge is domestic. The Trump administration is deploying an economic strategy biased to «that foreigners pay.» In addition to tariffs, it has flirted with taxing US debt holdings by non -resident investors. Direct threats to the independence of the Federal Reserve (FED) have further agitated the nerves. There are risks of disruption on three interconnected fronts: to hold a federal deficit close to 7% of GDP and a debt ratio on GDP that will be around 130% in 2025 [según la Oficina Presupuestaría del Congreso] It requires the continuous trust of investors; And if these fear punitive actions or perceive a politicization of the monetary authority, they could demand an additional premium at the cost of interest that further complicates fiscal sustainability. The independence of the Federal Reserve is a higher good that, if damaged, would raise the perception of future inflation risk and would contribute to raising the premium for fiscal dominance – or of subordination of monetary policy to the financial needs of the State. Finally, together with the rule of law and macroeconomic stability, the premise of equal treatment between resident and foreigners investors is a fundamental pillar for the attraction of foreign direct investment. The second pressure source is of external origin. The world order emerged after 1945 is going through a process of change and regionalization. The proliferation of alternative payment systems and the digitalization of interbank balances reduce the friction of trade outside the dollar. The US quota in the global GDP is eroded – gradually – as well as Asia's growing. The center of economic and financial gravity moves to the east and is accompanied by a process of diversification of official reserves, slow but constant, and the search for new refuge assets such as the debt of some OECD countries with recurrent current surplus, and as strategic raw materials and precious metals. In April, an increase in domestic bias has been perceived when it comes to materializing investments by many European and Asian institutions. The dynamics mentioned here are questioned by the US Treasury's debt capacity to continue providing a differential character of antifragility and contribute, via a “service premium”, to control the country's federal debt financing cost. They also question the dollar. It is not discussed whether the dollar will disappear – it is unlikely -, to what extent what speed will be diluted its supremacy. If the political uncertainty in Washington persists, the risk is of intensification of rotation out of dollars. A collateral, but relevant aspect for the construction of global assets of assets, is that a punishment parallel to the dollar and the treasure bonds could alter the historical patterns between US fixed -income returns and global variable income (beyond the influence of the mix of growth and inflation, altered from the pandemic), forcing the managers to incorporate traditionally marginal assets, Infrastructure, indexed debt debt – as pillars of resilience. At the beginning of May, the tariff truce and moderation in Trump's speech on the Fed have returned some calm: the dollar has partially recovered positions, the types of the long -term treasure debt have yielded and their returns recover positive correlation with the variable income. The lived episode reflects how easy and fast the credibility can be lost. The threat has been installed in the collective memory. Reversing the situation definitively will require unequivocal signs of respect for monetary institutions, fiscal discipline and regulatory stability. Without this commitment, American exceptionalism will continue to be subjected to scrutiny. It may not have been extinguished, but it is no longer axiomatic. It depends, more than ever, on the will to preserve the foundations – legal, macroeconomic and strategic – that support it. JOSÉ MANUEL AMOR is a director of Economic Analysis and markets of AFI and professor of AFI Global Education.
